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SOCIAL MEDIA DEFAMATION: A 
NEW LEGAL FRONTIER AMID THE 
INTERNET WILD WEST 
HADLEY M. DREIBELBIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Social media platforms have become the primary news source for 
many Americans. A 2019 Pew study found that over half of U.S. adults 
(55 percent) regularly rely on social media for their news.1 Of these 
respondents, 52 percent received their news from Facebook, while 
YouTube was the second most popular platform at 28 percent, followed 
by Twitter and Instagram at 17 and 14 percent, respectively.2 This 
evolution of social media as newsgathering often means sacrificing 
accuracy for expediency. Misinformation should be taken more 
seriously, because it can lead to devastating consequences. Posting false 
statements about people, even on social media platforms, can cause 
reputational ruin, financial damage, and lost economic opportunities. 
Social media “influencers,” government officials, and even ordinary 
users can cause lasting harm with the click of one button. 
To rectify these injuries, courts have extended the concept of 
defamation beyond traditional media outlets like news publishers and 
broadcasters to include statements made online to hold reckless social 
media users responsible for their posts.3 But because defamation is 
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 1.  Elizabeth Grieco and Elisa Shearer, Americans Are Wary of the Role Social Media Sites 
Play in Delivering News, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/10/02/ 
americans-are-wary-of-the-role-social-media-sites-play-in-delivering-the-news/. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Nicole Pelletier, The Emoji That Cost $20,000: Triggering Liability for Defamation on 
Social Media, 52 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 227, 231 n.31 (2016). 
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state-based law, it is being applied in diverse ways, creating conflicting 
precedent. Some courts treat social media speech as per se hyperbole 
and exaggerated opinion, unable to be treated as an actionable 
statement of fact.4 On the other hand, other courts have rigidly applied 
traditional defamation principles, without understanding the unique 
context of social media as a casual, loose form of communication.5 
This Note presents a navigable standard that recognizes that most 
users are unaware of the ramifications of their defamatory posts, while 
still holding them accountable for causing real harm to targeted 
individuals. Parts I & II discuss the development of defamation law and 
its First Amendment limitations. Part III looks at the courts’ application 
of traditional defamation law to statements made on social media. It 
separates those courts that treat social media speech as opinion per se 
versus those who stringently apply a traditional defamation test, and it 
identifies some common traits of social media speech that help 
understand the court’s reasoning. Finally, Part IV presents a limiting 
principle that should be applied to social media speech that balances 
the unique, freewheeling nature of the platforms with the need to hold 
users accountable for publishing false, damaging information.  
I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PROTECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
The First Amendment protects the ability of Americans to speak 
freely and to associate with whomever they choose. This means that the 
government “has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”6 Even highly 
offensive speech is protected, because the government “must remain 
neutral in the marketplace of ideas.”7 The United States adheres to the 
principle that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
 
 4.  See, e.g., Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014); Glob. Telemedia Int’l, Inc. 
v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Summit Bank v. Rogers,  142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
40, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Matter of Konig v. WordPress.com, 978 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013); Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd. v. Google, 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 415–16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); 
Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 5.  See, e.g., Unsworth v. Musk, No. 2:18-cv-08048-SVW-JC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167626 
at *13 (C.D. Cal. 2019); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); AvePoint, 
Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496, 508–09 (W.D. Va. 2013); SIO3, Inc. v. 
Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. CV 07-6311-EJL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129000 at *18 (D. Idaho 
2008); Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); and 
Sanders v. Walsh, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
 6.  Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 7.  Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726, 745–46 (1978)). 
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sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”8 
Courts do recognize exceptions to this broad protection, however, 
in certain instances of defamatory speech or serious threats. Specific 
exceptions include “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent 
lawless action; obscenity; defamation; speech integral to criminal 
conduct; so-called ‘fighting words’; child pornography; fraud; true 
threats; and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the 
government has the power to prevent.”9 These exceptions have “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”10 
When speech is considered outside the First Amendment, it may either 
be prohibited outright or significantly restrained. Defamation, defined 
as a false statement of fact, is considered one of the categories of speech 
which may be significantly restrained. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF DEFAMATION LAW 
Defamation, a concept originating in 13th century English common 
law, aims to protect individuals from reputational harm stemming from 
false statements.11 Historically speaking, the victims of defamation 
were often the Church or government–they had causes of action. 
Whereas today, defamation law primarily regulates behavior between 
private parties. While defamation law originally targeted seditious and 
blasphemous speech, it now concentrates on speech injurious to 
individual reputation.12 These false statements are made either in 
writing (libel) or orally (slander) and are governed by state law.13 When 
defamation law was imported to America, the Founders did not 
recognize the tensions between this enshrinement of defamation law in 
the legal systems of American colonies and a burgeoning national 
constitutional framework protective of free expression.14 This seeming 
 
 8.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 9.  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012). 
 10.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 11.  See Defamation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining defamation as a 
“false written or oral statement that damages another’s reputation”). 
 12.  See David L. Hudson Jr., Libel and Slander, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 
14, 2020), https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/997/libel-and-slander (stating that “the most 
important legal issue in a defamation case is determining the status of the plaintiff”). 
 13.  Defamation, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
defamation (last accessed Oct. 25, 2020). 
 14.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
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contradiction came to a head in the 1960s, when the Supreme Court for 
the first time applied the First Amendment to a defamation claim, 
thereby constitutionalizing defamation.15 After New York Times v. 
Sullivan, the First Amendment imposed heightened requirements of 
intent and greater protections for speech. This application created new 
tension between punishing false speech and protecting free 
expression.16 Later defamation cases further defined the distinctions 
between actual malice and negligence standards,17 public figures and 
private individuals,18 and what activities could be considered matters of 
public concern.19 
To establish a prima facie case of defamation, there must be “(a) a 
false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an 
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to 
negligence on the part of the publisher with respect to the act of 
publication; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of 
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the 
publication.”20 This test is particularly difficult to apply to speech made 
on a social media platform. To establish falsity, a plaintiff needs to 
distinguish fact from opinion, which can be difficult on a platform like 
Twitter where speech is generally hyperbolic, sometimes caustic, and 
prone to an “anything goes” attitude where users feel immune from 
consequences.21 Additionally, publication was once a barrier for many 
defaming parties due to the limited number of newspapers, media 
outlets, and broadcasters serving as traditional publishers.22 Internet 
and social media platforms, however, allow users to express themselves 
without the oversight of editorial gatekeepers. The Internet  
 
 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”). 
 15.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964). 
 16.  See id. (holding that the First Amendment applies to defamation law). 
 17.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“We hold that, so long as they do 
not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard 
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.”). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). 
 20.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 21.  Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 22.  See Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and Its Remedies Look Like in 
the Age of Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 433, 452 (2013) (noting that the standardized publishing 
process limited the time institutions could publish). 
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democratized speech and thus expanded opportunities for exposure, 
but it also opened doors to defamation liability. 
This Part explains how the evolution of defamation law led to the 
unique challenges facing social media speech today. First, it discusses 
the historical roots of defamation law in America. Next, it outlines the 
constitutionalization of libel law and the transition from criminal to 
civil liability. It then discusses the implications of applying the First 
Amendment to defamation law, including the development of an 
“actual malice” liability standard and distinctions between public 
figures, private individuals, and what constitutes matters of public 
concern. Finally, it highlights the specific challenges of applying 
defamation law in the social media context. 
A. American Defamation Law’s Early Roots 
The early origins of American defamation law can be traced 
directly to the English Star Chamber, which covered crimes of forgery, 
perjury, riots, maintenance, fraud, libel, and conspiracy.23 Under the 
reign of King Henry VIII in the 16th century, the Star Chamber began 
focusing on prosecuting critics of the crown.24 Even after the abolition 
of the Star Chamber in 1641, common law continued to cover 
prosecution of criminal libel.25 Colonists then imported seditious libel 
to pre-independence America and prosecuted it vigorously under 
criminal law.26 At that time, only proof that a defamatory statement had 
been spoken or written was all that was required for conviction; truth 
was not a defense.27 
The trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 greatly influenced the 
development of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Zenger, 
the printer of the New York Weekly Journal, was prosecuted for 
seditious libel for criticism of New York Governor William Cosby.28 At 
the time, seditious libel was defined as  intentional publication of 
written criticism of public institutions, “without lawful excuse or 
 
 23.  Martin Gruberg, Star Chamber, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), 
https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/820/star-chamber. 
 24.  Eric P. Robinson, Criminal Libel, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/941/criminal-libel. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Defamation in 18th century America meant the publication of statements “intended to 
criticize or provoke dissatisfaction with the government.” Id. 
 28.  Crown v. John Peter Zenger, 1735, HIST. SOC’Y OF THE N.Y. CTS., 
http://libdata.lib.ua.edu/login?url=https://history.nycourts.gov/case/crown-v-zenger/ (last 
accessed Mar. 11, 2021). 
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justification.”29 The role of the jury was merely to decide whether 
Zenger was responsible for the allegedly libelous statement.30 To the 
court’s surprise, Zenger’s counsel admitted Zenger’s responsibility, but 
he asked the jury to put aside the law and consider the truth of the 
statements published.31 The jury subsequently found Zenger “not 
guilty” of publishing seditious libel.32 Notwithstanding this 
advancement, states still continued to prosecute criminal libel under 
common law until the 1960s. 
New York developed truth as a qualified defense to criminal libel 
in 1805, and a majority of states gradually followed suit.33 Despite this 
legal evolution, however, defamation was still prosecuted as a strict 
liability offense, which meant that statements were presumed false and 
defendants bore the burden of proving truth.34 In 1942, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that defamation was outside the bounds of protected 
First Amendment speech, stating that the prevention and punishment 
of libelous statements had “never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”35 This strict separation of defamation and 
First Amendment screeched to a halt, however, in 1964. 
B. The Constitutionalization of Defamatory Speech 
In Sullivan,36 the Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to a 
civil libel case for the first time and introduced the actual malice 
standard of intent to defamation law, significantly limiting the tort’s 
scope.37 The case involved a newspaper ad defending Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and the civil rights movement.38 The ad described police 
violence in Montgomery, Alabama, and a police commissioner sued the 
newspaper claiming the ad was defamatory.39 The Supreme Court first 
addressed the issue of First Amendment protection by stating, “Like 
insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts . . . and the various 
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Robinson, supra note 24. 
 34.  See Alfred C. Yen, It’s Not That Simple: An Unnecessary Elimination of Strict Liability 
and Presumed Damage In Libel Law, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593, 597 (1988) (“If the 
statement was defamatory, a defendant was held strictly liable at common law for actual harm 
proven at trial by the plaintiff.”). 
 35.  315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 36.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 37.  Id. at 269. 
 38.  Id. at 257. 
 39.  Id. at 256, 257. 
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other formulae for the repression of expression that have been 
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from 
constitutional limitations.”40 The Court further asserted a commitment 
to “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues, even 
if it may include “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.”41 “[E]rroneous statement 
is inevitable in free debate,” and free speech requires “breathing space” 
to survive.42 
To foster democratic debate, the Court required a higher level of 
intent when the allegedly defamatory speech involves a public official.43 
The Court emphasized the importance of treating government officials 
as “men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate,” because 
“[p]olitical conduct and views which some respectable people approve, 
and others condemn, are constantly imputed to [them].”44 Thus, citizens 
and participants in the political process should be given wide latitude 
to discuss the characteristics and qualifications of those responsible for 
governing, and the Court ultimately held that speech about politicians 
and public officials is subject to the actual malice standard.45 The actual 
malice standard, unlike the less rigorous negligence standard, requires 
the plaintiff to prove the statements were published with the 
knowledge that they were false or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth.46 
In the same year, the Supreme Court ruled in Garrison v. Louisiana 
that the actual malice standard would apply in criminal libel 
prosecutions as well.47 The Court also recognized truth as an absolute 
defense.48 This holding paved the way to the Court’s ruling in Ashton v. 
Kentucky in 1966, which effectively eliminated common law criminal 
libel and limited criminal prosecutions of libel to statutory law.49 
Presently, only fifteen states and U.S. territories have criminal libel 
statutes, and cases are rarely prosecuted.50 
 
 
 40.  Id. at 269. 
 41.  Id. at 270. 
 42.  Id. at 271–72. 
 43.  Id. at 279–80. 
 44.  Id. at 272 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). 
 45.  Id. at 281. 
 46.  Id. at 280. 
 47.  379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964). 
 48.  Id. at 73. 
 49.  384 U.S. 195, 201 (1966). 
 50.  Robinson, supra note 24. 
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Soon after Ashton, the Court extended the actual malice standard 
to apply to public figures in addition to public officials in Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts.51 Here, the plaintiff was a well-known 
University of Georgia athletic director who brought a libel action 
against the publisher of a magazine, Saturday Evening Post, for 
publishing an article accusing Butts of conspiring to “fix” a football 
game.52 Because Butts commanded “a substantial amount of 
independent public interest” at the time of publication, the Court 
considered him a public figure with sufficient access to the media and 
therefore had the ability to rebut the allegedly defamatory 
statements.53 The Court ultimately held that a public figure must also 
prove actual malice on the part of publishers to recover damages for 
defamation.54 
C. Distinguishing Public Figures from Private Individuals 
In the subsequent years, the Supreme Court further outlined the 
distinctions between public figures and private citizens and activities of 
public concern versus those of a private nature. These distinctions are 
critical, because they determine whether a plaintiff must prove actual 
malice or merely negligence to build a prima facie case of defamation. 
The Court determined in Gertz v. Robert Welch that defamation 
cases involving private individuals require a lesser level of intent than 
actual malice.55 In this case, the petitioner was an attorney who 
represented the victim’s family in a civil suit against a police officer 
convicted of his murder.56 The respondent, a magazine publisher, 
published an article claiming the officer’s prosecution was part of a 
“Communist campaign against the police” and accused petitioner of 
being the “architect” of this conspiracy.57 
Rather than focusing on whether the trial was under public scrutiny, 
the Court instead defined the boundaries of when a plaintiff should be 
considered a public figure or official versus a private individual. Public 
figures “have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public 
 
 51.  388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 52.  Id. at 135. 
 53.  Id. at 154–55. 
 54.  Id. at 155. 
 55.  See 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a 
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”). 
 56.  Id. at 325. 
 57.  Id. at 325–26. 
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controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues 
involved” and “invite attention and comment.”58 The Court 
emphasized that truly involuntary public figures are “exceedingly 
rare.”59 Because of this, publishers are entitled to presume that public 
officials and public figures have done so voluntarily and with 
knowledge of the increased risk of exposure that accompanies this 
attention.60 This stands in contrast with private individuals, who have 
“relinquished no part of [their] interest in the protection of [their] own 
good name,” have less access to outlets to rebut defamatory statements, 
and are thus more vulnerable to injury.61 By contrast, public figures, due 
to their prominence in society, “usually enjoy significantly greater 
access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a 
more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private 
individuals normally enjoy.”62 
The Court also distinguished between two types of public figures: 
general-purpose and limited-purpose. General-purpose public figures 
have achieved “such pervasive fame or notoriety” to be a public figure 
in all contexts.63 Alternatively, limited-purpose public figures have 
voluntarily injected themselves or been drawn into “a particular public 
controversy” and become a public figure for only a limited range of 
issues and duration.64 When evaluating a limited-purpose public figure, 
courts must look to “the nature and extent of an individual’s 
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the 
defamation.”65 For example, celebrities like Brad Pitt, well-known 
musicians like Adele, and high-powered company executives like Bill 
Gates may be considered general-purpose public figures. On the other 
hand, limited-purpose public figures might include David Hogg, one of 
the Parkland survivors-turned-activists, or Casey Anthony, the 
controversial defendant acquitted for the murder of her child in 2011. 
In Gertz, the Court determined that the petitioner, acting as an 
attorney, was not a limited-purpose public figure, since he had not 
discussed the controversy with the press, had not engaged the public’s  
 
 
 58.  Id. at 345. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 344. 
 63.  Id. at 351. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 352. 
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attention, and did not “thrust himself into the vortex” of the public 
issue.66 Consequently, he was a private individual.67 
The decision in Time, Inc. v. Firestone further narrowed the scope 
of the public figure distinction by holding that local notoriety alone 
does not qualify an individual as a public figure.68 The defendant in the 
case was the publisher of Time magazine who wrote an article 
inaccurately claiming that plaintiff’s high-profile divorce was the result 
of extramarital affairs and extreme cruelty.69 Defendant argued that the 
plaintiff, who had been married to the heir of the Firestone tire 
company fortune, was a public figure due to the public’s interest in the 
salacious details of an extremely wealthy couple’s marital difficulties.70 
In its brief, the defendant cited the District Court’s finding that “[d]ue 
to the social position of the participants and the sensational, colorful 
testimony at the trial, there was national news coverage” and that the 
plaintiff was a “central figure” in this controversy.71 The Court rejected 
this reasoning, saying the plaintiff “did not assume any role of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach 
society.”72 Plaintiff was “compelled to go to court by the State” in order 
to obtain a divorce and did not freely choose to publicize details of her 
married life.73 Otherwise, she was merely a private individual—Russell 
Firestone’s former wife and a “onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher.”74 
Not all controversies of interest to the public equate to “public 
controversies,” and local notoriety alone does not transform an 
individual into a public figure. 
To be considered a public figure, the individual must also have 
voluntarily participated in public activities. Courts have considered, 
inter alia, the following activities to be “public activities”: advocating 
on national security issues, prominently opposing nuclear testing, 
posing as a Playboy Playmate, and professional belly dancing.75 For 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). 
 69.  Id. at 451–52. 
 70.  Id. at 454. 
 71.  Brief for Petitioner at 32–34, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (No. 74-944), 
1975 WL 173764. 
 72.  Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976). 
 73.  Id. at 454. 
 74.  Id. at 452. 
 75.  See e.g., Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966); Secord 
v. Cockburn, 747 F.Supp. 779, 784 (D.D.C. 1990); Vitale v. Nat’l Lampoon, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 442, 
DREIBELBIS_03_16_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  7:14 PM 
2021] SOCIAL MEDIA DEFAMATION & THE FIRST AMENDMENT 255 
example, in a case concerning a researcher whose work was lambasted 
by a Member of Congress, the Court examined the researcher’s 
activities to determine whether he was a limited-purpose public figure 
or private individual.76 The Court ultimately held that he was a private 
individual, because he did not invite widespread public attention and 
comment by submitting federal grant applications or publishing his 
research.77 Furthermore, his access to the media was not “regular and 
continuing”—he merely responded to the allegedly defamatory 
statement.78 To the extent his research was of public concern, it was 
because of the Member’s statement.79 As the Court emphasized, 
“[T]hose charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create 
their own defense by making the claimant a public figure.”80 
These distinctions between general purpose public figures, limited-
purpose public figures, and private individuals are critical for 
determining defamation liability, because they set the level of intent 
required for the defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement. Actual 
malice, the standard for public figures, is much harder to overcome than 
negligence, the standard for private individuals. 
D. Social Media’s Unique Challenges to Defamation Law 
The unique nature of social media platforms presents challenges to 
the application of traditional elements of defamation. First, a court 
must distinguish fact from opinion in circumstances where the two may 
appear virtually indistinguishable. It must also navigate the blurry line 
of who constitutes a public figure in the age of internet virality. Finally, 
a court will also need to reckon with the increased liability driven by 
the social media model of “users as content publishers.” 
To succeed on a defamation claim, plaintiffs must prove “falsity,” 
which requires distinguishing fact from opinion.81 The Court separates 
this inquiry into two parts: a statement must be (1) “provable as false,”82 
 
445 (E.D. Pa. 1978); and James v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 840 (N.Y. 1976). 
 76.  See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135–36 (1979) (narrowing the scope of 
limited-purpose public figure). 
 77.  Id. at 135. 
 78.  Id. at 136. 
 79.  Id. at 135. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”). 
 82.  Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). 
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and (2) “reasonably . . . interpreted as stating actual facts.”83 The 
majority of state jurisdictions consider a totality of the circumstances 
under the second prong.84 Courts may evaluate the medium through 
which the statement was published, the purpose of the communication, 
and the overall context.85 Social media is often seen as more informal—
a forum where users vent, get into heated debates, and crack jokes.86 In 
an environment where social media users are viewed as more 
freewheeling or careless when speaking, the lines are blurred even 
further, and it becomes nearly impossible to distinguish opinions from 
factual statements during the falsity analysis. The unique nature of 
social media communication plays a significant role in evaluating 
whether, under the circumstances, the assertion at issue can be 
reasonably interpreted as a statement of fact. 
As acknowledged by the line of defamation cases, public figures 
enjoy a unique platform that private individuals do not—they are able 
to easily reach the broader public due to their notoriety and have the 
ability to quickly respond to damaging statements through numerous 
media channels.87 Additionally, public figures willingly assume the risks 
inherent in participating in public life. 
However, with the advent of rapid-response social media platforms 
and the nature of Internet virality, private individuals now have access 
to the broader public, too. Average social media users may find 
themselves going “viral” over a humorous tweet or video and can 
parlay this attention into the development of a personal brand. For 
example, comedian Sarah Cooper became known on Twitter and 
TikTok in early 2020 for her lip-synching parodies of President Donald 
Trump; she then leveraged the exposure she gained from these videos 
to sign with a talent agency, land a Netflix comedy special, and even 
began developing a CBS television series.88 Social media posts that gain 
 
 83.  Id. at 20 (citing Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). 
 84.  See, e.g., McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842 (1st Cir. 1987); Janklow v. Newsweek, 
Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 1985), aff’d on reh’g, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
107 S. Ct. 272 (1986); Scott v. News-Herald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250 (Ohio 1986); Info. Control 
Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 85.  Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd. v. Google, 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
 86.  Pelletier, supra note 3, at 236. 
 87.  The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help–using available opportunities 
to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of 
effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false 
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
 88.  Megh Wright, Sarah Cooper Has a TV Show in the Words Now Too, VULTURE (Aug. 
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significant traction may also be republished by established media 
outlets, enshrining their perceived legitimacy. Finally, anyone with a 
social media account can rebut a damaging post with a “reply” or 
“comment,” and that response is permanently linked to the offending 
post. This democratization of social media access makes it all the more 
likely that any social media user could be perceived as at least a limited-
purpose public figure, increasing the intent level required to prove 
defamation. 
Finally, the publication process itself is impacted by the advent of 
social media. For traditional media outlets, the publishing process 
involves fact-checking, extensive copyediting, and even legal review.89 
Prior to the modern news era, these publishers and broadcasters also 
had the luxury of time—consistent distribution times, limited 
publication, and scheduled newscasts ensured that journalists had more 
time to develop—and verify—their stories.90 
Now, social media (particularly Twitter) has drastically changed the 
speed at which “breaking news” is disseminated. Audiences demand 
instantaneous reporting of information, which leaves almost no time to 
formally review to ensure accuracy. Social media users become 
newsgatherers and reporters themselves, filming public videos of 
incidents and sharing firsthand information that is later picked up by 
news outlets. Liabilities for false and defamatory statements thus 
spread to all publishers, not just those in the traditional media industry. 
Unlike traditional news editors, however, social media users are often 
unaware of the danger of posting content that harms another’s 
reputation. 
III.  COURT’S EVALUATION OF CONTEXT IN  
THE SOCIAL MEDIA AGE 
Courts from California to New York have considered the role of 
defamation analysis in speech published on social media. Some courts 
treat social media speech as per se hyperbole, citing to factors like its 
casual, imprecise language, anonymity, and lack of editorial oversight.91 
 
20, 2020), https://www.vulture.com/2020/08/sarah-cooper-tv-show-cbs-comedy.html. 
 89.  Angelotti, supra note 22, at 451–52. 
 90.  Id. at 452. 
 91.  See, e.g., Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014); Glob. Telemedia Int’l, Inc. 
v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Summit Bank v. Rogers, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
40, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Matter of Konig v. WordPress.com, 978 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013); Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd. v. Google, 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 415–16 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); 
Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
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Other courts apply traditional defamation principles to social media 
speech, pointing to the recklessness with which users post statements 
and the specific knowledge claimed when asserting falsehoods.92 All 
courts recognize the unique nature of communication via social media 
platforms. 
A. One View: Social Media Speech Is Per Se Hyperbole 
Ever since social media exploded in the early 2000s with the 
development of Facebook, YouTube, MySpace, and Twitter,93 courts 
have grappled with the repercussions of this loose, freewheeling style 
of communication on laws regulating false statements of fact. Internet 
users treat “status updates,” “stories,” “snaps,” and “tweets” as blips 
on the radar—temporary expressions of feelings and venting rather 
than statements with consequences. Recognizing this use, some courts 
have treated social media speech as per se hyperbole, meaning that 
exaggerated language and expressions of opinion cannot be pinned 
down as statements of fact.94 Courts regularly cite the casual, venting 
nature of the speech, the possibility that the speech is published 
anonymously, and the lack of editorial standards to support their 
decision. Under this reasoning, social media speech cannot constitute 
defamation, and it is thus protected under the First Amendment. This 
treatment of social media speech has drawbacks, however, because it 
can lead to serious reputational harm without any viable means of legal 
recourse. 
1. Casual, Imprecise Statements 
New York courts are at the forefront of treating defamatory social 
media speech as per se hyperbole or opinion, and they often cite the 
informal nature of the speech. As Judge Ronnie Abrams articulated in 
a 2020 social media defamation decision, “If the Internet is akin to the 
 
 92.  See, e.g., Unsworth v. Musk, No. 2:18-cv-08048-SVW-JC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167626 
at *13 (C.D. Cal. 2019); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); AvePoint, 
Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496, 508–09 (W.D. Va. 2013); SIO3, Inc. v. 
Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. CV 07-6311-EJL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129000 at *18 (D. Idaho 
2008); Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); Sanders 
v. Walsh, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
 93.  Irfan Ahmad, The History of Social Media [Infographic], SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Apr. 
27, 2018), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/the-history-of-social-media-infographic-
1/522285/. 
 94.  See, e.g., Feld, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 4; Glob. Telemedia, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1270; Rogers, 142 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 62; Konig, 978 N.Y.S.2d at 94; Sandals, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 415–16; Jacobus, 51 
N.Y.S.3d at 339. 
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Wild West . . . Twitter is, perhaps, the shooting gallery, where verbal 
gunslingers engage in prolonged hyperbolic crossfire.”95 This crossfire 
blurs the line between fact and opinion, whether it happens on Twitter, 
online bulletin boards, or even over email. 
In 2011, the New York Appellate Division considered a case 
between Sandals Resorts and Google, where Sandals sought to compel 
Google to disclose the identity of a Gmail account holder who sent 
emails criticizing Sandals Resorts.96 The author of the email accused 
Sandals of prioritizing foreigners for senior managerial positions and 
relegating Jamaican nationals to menial jobs, all while receiving 
subsidies from the Jamaican government and being funded by Jamaican 
taxpayers.97 The court considered the statement as a whole, the overall 
context of the email, and the tone and apparent purpose of the speech 
to determine whether or not it was a statement of fact.98 It found that 
the email was an “exercise in rhetoric,” seeking investigation, and it 
had an angry and resentful tone.99 
The court then went further, stating that “[t]he culture of Internet 
communications, as distinct from that of print media such as 
newspapers and magazines, has been characterized as encouraging a 
‘freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.’”100 It also emphasized that 
Internet forums contain a “wide range of casual, emotive, and 
imprecise speech” which are riddled with “grammatical and spelling 
errors, the use of slang, and, in many instances, an overall lack of 
coherence.”101 The court ultimately held that while portions of the 
email could arguably be considered statements of fact, these portions 
“constitute facts supporting the writer’s opinion,” which rendered the 
entire email “pure opinion” not actionable under defamation law.102 
Similarly, the court in Global Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe 1 
held that pseudonymous messages on an Internet forum did not 
constitute defamation since they were considered per se hyperbole.103 
 
 95.  Ganske v. Mensch, No. 19-CV-6943, 2020 WL 4890423  at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020). 
 96.  Sandals, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 409. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 414. 
 99.  Id. at 415. 
 100.  Id. (citing Eirik Cheverud, Comment, Cohen v. Google, Inc., 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
333, 335 (2010)). 
 101.  Id. at 415–16 (citing Jennifer O’Brien, Note, Putting a Face to a (Screen) Name: The First 
Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPs to Reveal the Identities of Anonymous Internet 
Speakers in Online Defamation Cases, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2774–75 (2002)). 
 102.  Id. at 416. 
 103.  132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
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Using pseudonyms, defendants posted numerous messages on an 
Internet bulletin board referencing the plaintiff company in a “less-
than-flattering” manner.104 The court held that the statements were 
nonactionable opinion, in part because they were “full of hyperbole, 
invective, short-hand phrases and language not generally found in fact-
based documents, such as corporate press releases or SEC filings.”105 
For example, statements about the company’s investors also contained 
phrases like “get off my back cowboy,” “grow up kids before you fall 
off your perch,” and “gotta love this companies [sic] potential.”106 The 
postings “lack[ed] the formality and polish typically found in 
documents in which a reader would expect to find facts.”107 
Another case involving Internet message boards, Summit Bank v. 
Rogers, featured posts that the court considered to be “free-flowing 
diatribes (or ‘rants’) in which [defendant] does not use proper spelling 
or grammar, and which strongly suggest that these colloquial epithets 
are his own unsophisticated, florid opinions.”108 The court noted that 
the posts appeared in Craigslist’s “Rants and Raves” section, which 
should predispose the reader “to view them with a certain amount of 
skepticism, and with an understanding that they will likely present one-
sided viewpoints rather than assertions of provable facts.”109 
Courts also point to the argumentative and heated nature of social 
media debate as another reason to believe statements are per se 
opinion and not factual claims. In Matter of Konig v. Wordpress.com,110 
the court stated that given the context of speech made “on an Internet 
blog during a sharply contested election,” a respondent’s reference to 
“downright criminal actions” would reasonably be viewed as a 
statement of opinion rather than a factual criminal accusation.111 
Additionally, the court in Feld v. Conway noted that the allegedly 
defamatory tweet was “made as part of a heated Internet debate” 
before concluding that a reasonable person would not understand the 
tweet to contain actual facts.112 
 
 
 104.  Id. at 1264. 
 105.  Id. at 1267. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 109.  Id. at 60. 
 110.  978 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 111.  Id. at 94. 
 112.  16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014). 
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The strongest pronouncement that social media speech is per se 
opinion arrived with the 2017 case, Jacobus v. Trump.113 The plaintiff, 
public relations consultant Cheri Jacobus, was approached by Donald 
Trump’s presidential campaign to discuss her potential employment as 
the campaign’s communications director.114 Initially, Jacobus showed 
interest in the position. After an argument erupted during one of her 
meetings with campaign officials, however, she withdrew her 
candidacy.115 Months later, Jacobus criticized then-candidate Trump on 
television.116 Consequently, Trump published a series of tweets on 
Twitter that claimed Jacobus “begged” his campaign for a job, and that 
she “went hostile” after being turned down twice for the position.117 As 
a result, Jacobus faced vile personal attacks by Trump’s numerous 
Twitter followers. 118 In response, she filed a defamation suit against 
Trump that claimed his tweets cost her professional opportunities and 
injured her reputation as a political commentator. 
The New York Superior Court first looked to the context in which 
the statements were made, including “the words themselves and their 
purpose, the circumstances surrounding their use, and the manner, tone, 
and style with which they are used.”119 It further explained that 
statements made “during the course of a heated public debate” are not 
actionable—even if appearing to be statements of fact—because an 
audience would expect use of hyperbolic language and rhetoric.120 
Finally, the court confirmed that it was following a consistent precedent 
of protecting statements made in online forums as statements of 
opinion rather than fact.121 Although it recognized the significant 
harassment Jacobus received from Trump’s followers, her reputational 
injury, and her loss of professional and economic opportunities, the  
 
 
 113.  51 N.Y.S.3d 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 114.  Id. at 333. 
 115.  Id. at 334. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. Former President Trump’s Twitter account has since been permanently suspended 
due to “risk of further incitement of violence” after the insurrectionist storming of Capitol Hill 
on January 6, 2021. See Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER INC. (Jan. 8, 
2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html. 
 118.  See id. at 334–35 (stating that Jacobus was attacked through demeaning tweets, including 
“an image of plaintiff with a grossly disfigured face,” and a “depiction of her in a gas chamber 
with Trump standing nearby ready to push a button marked ‘Gas’”). 
 119.  Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 336 (quoting Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 291–92 
(N.Y. 1986)). 
 120.  Id. 336–37. 
 121.  Id. at 339. 
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court held Trump’s statements to be nonactionable opinions protected 
by the First Amendment.122 
In August 2020, Ganske v. Mensch involved conspiracy theorist 
Louise Mensch, who tweeted allegedly defamatory statements about 
former Associated Press (AP) journalist Charles Ganske accusing him 
of xenophobia and of “clearly personally spread[ing] Russian bots.”123 
Soon after this Twitter exchange, the AP fired Ganske.124 Despite the 
professional fallout from this exchange, the Ganske court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, relying on Jacobus for precedent and 
holding that a tweet calling someone “xenophobic” was nonactionable 
opinion.125 The court determined that the tweet’s language amounted 
to fiery rhetoric and a personal reaction to the plaintiff’s own words, 
rather than a conveyance of objective facts.126 Defendant Mensch also 
included a hyperlink in her tweet to the alleged bot activity.127 The court 
treated Mensch’s linking to a data set as laying a factual basis for her 
assertion and held it to be nonactionable.128 Finally, Mensch tweeted 
that Ganske was sent into a “frenzy,” which the court said has no 
precise meaning.129 
2. Anonymous Speech 
Courts also emphasize the often-anonymous nature of social media 
speech in categorizing it as per se opinion. Generally, plaintiffs who 
bring a defamation lawsuit must accurately name a defendant to state 
their claims.130 But social media platforms protect user identities 
(assuming users don’t themselves disclose personally identifying 
information) and only disclose them when dealing with circumstances 
like compliance with a court order.131 Therefore, unless plaintiffs 
convince a court to force platforms like Facebook or Twitter to disclose 
a user’s identity, they may not get very far with their defamation claims 
in the first place. 
 
 
 122.  Id. at 343. 
 123.  Ganske v. Mensch, No. 19-CV-6943, 2020 WL 4890423 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020). 
 124.  Id. at *3. 
 125.  Id. at *7. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at *6. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at *7. 
 130.  Cory Batza, Comment, Trending Now: The Role of Defamation Law in Remedying 
Harm from Social Media Backlash, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 429, 453 (2017). 
 131.  Id. 
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When a social media user only identifies by an anonymous 
username, not only will plaintiffs have a difficult time naming a 
defendant, but the courts may also be less likely to treat the statements 
made by that social media user as actionable statements of fact. For 
instance, in Krinsky v. Doe 6, pseudonymous accounts posted scathing 
critiques of a company on an Internet message board.132 Ultimately 
finding that these accounts merely posted nonactionable opinions and 
rhetoric, the court discussed “the relative anonymity afforded by the 
Internet forum [that] promotes a looser, more relaxed communication 
style.”133 Users may be more provocative, combative, and free to engage 
in criticism without fear of retribution.134 Thus, Internet discussions 
begin to look more like “vehicle[s] for emotional catharsis” than 
sources of news and information.135 The court added that the First 
Amendment has long protected the right to publish anonymously, in 
order to encourage ideas to enter the marketplace freely.136 
Both Sandals and Global Telemedia addressed the relationship 
between anonymity and alleged defamation. The Sandals court railed 
against disclosure of anonymous speakers’ identities, expressing 
concern that corporations and wealthy plaintiffs could use subpoenas 
to silence online critics through public identification.137 In Global 
Telemedia, the court stated that the proliferation of anonymous 
accounts created both a “general cacophony” and an “ongoing, free-
wheeling, and highly animated exchange” in the Internet chat room.138 
The court in Summit Bank emphasized that “the very fact that most of 
the posters remain anonymous, or pseudonymous, is a cue to discount 
their statements accordingly.”139 Not only did the court’s statement 
refute the important First Amendment protection of anonymity as a 
 
 132.  72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 133.  Id. at 237–38. 
 134.  Id. at 238. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s 
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the 
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.”). Indeed, authors publishing under pseudonyms have a long history in America. 
Perhaps the most notable example from American history is the Federalist Papers, written by 
John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, under the collective pseudonym “Publius.” 
Later, Hamilton and James Madison debated Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation under the 
pseudonyms “Pacificus” and “Helvidius,” respectively. See Pacificus/Helvidius Letters, George 
Washington’s Mount Vernon, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-
encyclopedia/article/pacificus-helvidius-letters/ (last accessed Nov. 8, 2020). 
 137.  Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd. v. Google, 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
 138.  Glob. Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 139.  Summit Bank v. Rogers, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
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means of advancing democratic debate; it also helped future 
defendants easily rebuff defamation claims. 
3. No Editorial Gatekeeping 
The third element courts often consider when determining social 
media speech to be per se opinion is the lack of editorial gatekeepers 
on Internet platforms. 
As the Sandals court noted, “The low barrier to speaking online 
allows anyone with an Internet connection to publish his thoughts, free 
from the editorial constraints that serve as gatekeepers for most 
traditional media of disseminating information.”140 These publishing 
guardrails established mechanisms for fact-checking and accuracy 
determinations that are often absent in rapid-fire social media 
publishing. Editorial gatekeepers also limit the number of publishers 
with access to media. This gatekeeping is now primarily relegated to 
traditional media platforms, as “anyone who has access to the Internet 
has access to . . . chat-rooms.”141 Social media platforms do not place 
constraints on publishing beyond their “community standards,” nor do 
they require any “special expertise, knowledge, or status” to post, tweet, 
or reply.142 
Another case, John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, involved pseudonymous 
statements posted on a community blog.143 Here, the court described 
the Internet as a “unique democratizing medi[a]” which allowed 
increasingly diverse people to engage in public debate.144 Speakers can 
“bypass mainstream media to speak directly” to an audience, and 
anyone can “become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox.”145 The court also found that this 
universal access allows individuals targeted by speech to directly 
correct the record without barriers.146 This ability counterbalances the 





 140.  Sandals, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 415 (citing O’Brien, supra note 101, at 2774–75). 
 141.  Glob. Telemedia, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
 144.  Id. at 455. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
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B. Opposing View: Social Media Speech Is Subject To Traditional 
Defamation Analysis 
Many other courts—particularly those in California—treat social 
media speech no differently than traditional media statements, 
applying the same defamation analysis to both. As more users turn to 
social media for breaking news, thoughtful analysis, and even 
engagement with traditional media outlets, social media users must 
ensure statement accuracy to prevent spreading damaging, false 
information. The court in SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com emphasized 
this view, stating that “[i]f the Internet is to be considered a 
‘marketplace of ideas’ and lent a commensurate air of trust and 
reliability, ‘it can never achieve its potential as such unless it is subject 
to the civilizing influence of the law like all other social discourses.’”147 
These courts that apply traditional defamation analysis primarily focus 
on three characteristics of social media speech in determining liability: 
(1) a serious tone; (2) claims of specialized knowledge, research, or 
news; and (3) specificity. 
1. Serious Nature of Remarks 
Courts are more willing to hold a social media user liable for 
defamation for statements made with a serious tone, using proper 
grammar and spelling. 
A case covered extensively in headlines, Unsworth v. Musk, 
considered tweets that Elon Musk published about a cave diver 
involved in the 2011 rescue of a child soccer team in Thailand.148 When 
the diver described Musk’s attempt to build a mini-submarine to rescue 
the boys as a “PR stunt,” Musk fired back on Twitter, accusing the 
rescuer of being “sus” (shorthand for suspicious), and a “pedo guy” (a 
common abbreviation for pedophile).149 He then sent an email to a 
Buzzfeed reporter doubling down on these claims.150 Although Musk 
argued that his tweets should be viewed with a “heavy presumption” 




 147.  SIO3, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. CV 07-6311-EJL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129000 at *18 (D. Idaho 2008) (citing Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 337 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (rev’d on alternate grounds)). 
 148.  Unsworth v. Musk, No. 2:18-cv-08048-SVW-JC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167626 at *2 
(C.D. Cal. 2019). 
 149.  Id. at *3–4. 
 150.  See id. at *7 (disclosing the specific text used in Musk’s email). 
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argument by noting that Twitter is now an important source of facts in 
addition to opinions.151 
Musk then argued that his tweets contained “imaginative and non-
literal” insults, and that his joking manner was obvious from his use of 
both shorthand and colloquialisms.152 The court acknowledged that 
some prior cases found loose, hyperbolic language to be nonactionable 
opinion.153 Nonetheless, it said that Musk’s tweets used “generally 
proper grammar with punctuation and had very few misspellings.”154 
Furthermore, Twitter’s 280-character limit often requires users to 
employ abbreviations and shorthand phrases. Therefore, the use of 
shorthand phrases should not automatically discount a tweet as opinion 
rather than fact.155 Ultimately, the court determined that Musk’s tweets 
contained facts susceptible to verification, because the “[p]laintiff 
either is a pedophile or he is not and, if he were, evidence could prove 
it.”156 
D.C. v. R.R. also examined the seriousness and tone of social media 
speech in the defamation context.157 In this case, the plaintiff—a 
student with an acting and singing career—maintained a website with 
an open “guestbook” for members of the public to post comments.158 
After several students at his school posted derogatory comments and 
threats on the website, D.C. sued them over libelous statements about 
his sexual orientation.159 Although the court primarily discussed these 
statements under its analysis of a “true threat,” its language about 
online speech is enlightening. According to the court, these statements 
were not merely “a few words shouted during a brawl”; rather, they 
constituted a “series of grammatically correct sentences composed at a 
computer keyboard.”160 The author had to deliberate before pressing 
the “send” button, giving him time to retract the words.161 Thus, the 
court deduced the statement’s tone from the students’ grammatical 
choices. 
 
 151.  Id. at *11. 
 152.  Id. at *15–16. 
 153.  Id. at *15. 
 154.  Id. at *16. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at *20. 
 157.  106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 158.  Id. at 405–06. 
 159.  Id. at 406. 
 160.  Id. at 420. 
 161.  Id. 
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2. Claims of Specialized Knowledge 
Courts are also more likely to evaluate social media speech under 
traditional defamation analysis when the poster claims to be 
“unbiased,” have “specialized knowledge,” or calls his posts “Research 
Reports,” bulletins, or alerts.162 For instance, in AvePoint, Inc. v. Power 
Tools, Inc., employees of a rival company engaged in a series of false 
and deceptive claims about its competitor on Twitter and in direct 
customer communications.163 The Twitter statements insinuated that 
AvePoint was a Chinese company, using the hashtag 
“MADEINCHINA” and referring to the company as the “Red 
Dragon.”164 AvePoint relied on business with the federal government, 
who must give preferential treatment to domestic production.165 The 
rival company also claimed its product was “Microsoft recommended” 
over AvePoint software, which could have prejudiced AvePoint’s 
business.166 When employees of a competitor company post statements 
about their rival, they are speaking with the knowledge derived from 
their specialized industry—in this case, software. Therefore, the court 
found that potential customers were more likely to view these 
statements as serious assertions of fact.167 
SI03 v. Bodybuilding.com also touched on Internet speech that 
spoke to company practices.168 Acknowledging that it is often difficult 
to determine the line between actionable statements of fact and 
protected opinion, the court said, “False statements about a company 
and/or its products literally killing people go beyond the general 
distasteful nature that is, at times, dominant within an electronic forum 
like Internet chat rooms.”169 Even though the statements were riddled 
with colloquialisms and grammatical mistakes, they still had potential 
to mislead customers and harm the company’s reputation, making 
them actionable under defamation law. 
 
 162.  See, e.g., Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 42 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2007) (holding defendant liable for defamation due to its claimed “specialized 
knowledge in the areas of financial accounting and issues of earnings” and publications titled 
“Research Reports”). 
 163.  981 F. Supp. 2d 496, 503 (W.D. Va. 2013). 
 164.  Id. at 507. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 508. 
 167.  Id. at 509. 
 168.  SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com, LLC, No. CV 07-6311-EJL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129000 at *1 (D. Idaho 2008). 
 169.  Id. at *32. 
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3. Specificity Means Provability 
Statements made with specificity are also more likely to be 
considered statements of fact. Notably, many of the cases where 
Internet speech is considered specific and actionable involve business 
reviews on Yelp and other online message boards, where customers 
may be misled or real economic consequences could be felt. 
The Unsworth court not only discussed the serious nature of Musk’s 
statements, but also their specificities.170 In Musk’s emails to Buzzfeed, 
he made additional specific allegations of pedophilia against the 
plaintiff.171 These included, in part, that “[h]e’s an old, single white guy 
from England who[] . . . mov[ed] to Chiang Rai for a child bride who 
was about 12 years old at the time.”172 The court concluded that the 
email was written in “clear, plain, and non-figurative language.”173 It 
also found that Musk alleged “highly detailed facts that, due to their 
specific nature, could be readily verified.”174 Furthermore, the court 
determined that his tweet that offered a “signed dollar” to anyone who 
could confirm the cave rescuer’s alleged pedophilia did not 
communicate “uncertainty”; instead, it doubled down on Musk’s 
willingness to “bet on [the statement’s] veracity.”175 
In Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios, the court examined a 
defendant’s Yelp review of an apartment building.176 The defendant 
stated in his review that the new owners of the building likely 
“contributed to the death[s] of three tenants. . . and the departure[s] of 
eight more.”177 He also claimed they sought evictions of six long-term 
tenants without cause, and that he had “personally witnessed” the 
owners’s “abhorrent behavior.”178 The court held these statements to 
be “purported facts,” even though the posts also contained hyperbolic 
language.179 It distinguished the precedents of Krinsky and Summit 
Bank as cases consisting of “true rants and raves,” while arguing that 
the cases did not “preclude the courts from taking serious Internet 
speech seriously.”180 Furthermore, although generalized comments may 
 
 170.  No. 2:18-cv-08048-SVW-JC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167626 at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2019). 
 171.  See id. at *6–7. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at *17. 
 174.  Id. at *20. 
 175.  Id. at *18–19. 
 176.  160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 423, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 430. 
 180.  Id. at 433. 
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indicate expressions of opinion, “specifics, if given, may signal the 
opposite and render an Internet posting actionable.”181 
That same year, a California state court considered a defamation 
suit involving another Yelp review. In Sanders v. Walsh, the court 
analyzed anonymous statements made about a business owner.182 The 
defendants posted a series of statements on “RipoffReport.com,” 
claiming that plaintiff used an “unauthorized” check to purchase a wig 
from the store and forged a FedEx letter to show an attempted 
return.183 Here, the court held that the statements were not “vague 
implications” of fact but were instead “specific factual claims.”184 It 
rested this conclusion on two bases: First, the statements about the 
plaintiff’s city contracts were prefaced by “Fact:,” and alleged historical 
claims of perjury and fraud.185 Second, these statements—such as one 
alleging that the plaintiff gave “all the construction business in 
Anaheim for a[n] under the table bribe”—could be proven true or 
false.186 Therefore, the court found that the specificity of the statements 
made them provable and thus actionable under defamation law. 
IV.  WHO HAS IT RIGHT? 
Social media has become an increasingly globalized 
communications tool and an important platform for delivering 
breaking news. Courts should hold social media users responsible for 
the statements they post because these statements could be viewed as 
serious, newsworthy, and consequential due to the prominence of these 
platforms. Defamation law should not apply a rigid test, however, that 
fails to consider the instantaneous, freewheeling nature of social media 
speech. Courts should instead consider a more balanced approach. 
First, they should consider the context of the speech in their falsity 
analyses, including whether the statements made with exaggerated 
language, casual conversation, and heated rhetoric. Consequently, 
social media statements made with specificity and serious tone would 
be treated more like actionable statements of fact rather than per se 
hyperbole. Any resulting potential for increased liability from the 
falsity analysis could be counterbalanced by heightening the requisite 
 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 196. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
DREIBELBIS_03_16_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2021  7:14 PM 
270 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 16 
level of intent for alleged defamers to actual malice—particularly when 
plaintiffs are “influencers” with large social media followings. Courts 
should treat all online platforms consistently when conducting this 
analysis, recognizing that Twitter and blogs are no longer mere casual 
conversation platforms. 
A.  Finding A More Balanced Approach 
Courts must apply the traditional elements of defamation to the 
facts of a social media case. By treating social media speech as per se 
opinion or hyperbole, courts are undervaluing the impact that this 
speech has on individuals’s reputations and economic opportunities. 
There are currently 330 million monthly active users on Twitter,187 2.45 
billion on Facebook,188 and over one billion on Instagram.189 Users of 
these sites rely on accurate information to make purchasing decisions, 
stay informed about breaking news, and share reliable data with their 
personal networks of family and friends. These sites are no longer mere 
outlets solely for blowing off steam or sharing personal opinions; they 
are increasingly e-commerce and news platforms too. Speech made on 
these social media platforms must be taken seriously. 
Courts may, however, look to the context in which a statement is 
made on social media to determine whether there is an actionable false 
statement of fact. Opinions, “hot takes,” and casual conversations are 
just as critical as statements of fact, breaking news, and detailed serious 
language to social media communications. In order to determine 
whether a reasonable user would believe the individual was making an 
actionable statement of fact, any application of the defamation test 
must consider the speech’s specific facts, tone, and language. Social 
media platforms should not be independently evaluated as per se 
“opinion” sites; instead, courts should conduct a context-specific 
analysis, looking to the broader conversation, debate, or thread. 
For example, say one Twitter user gets into an argument with 
another over a political disagreement and posts, “@TwitterUser2 roots 
for death and destruction! He wants to see this country ruined.” These 
statements, which may be hurtful to @TwitterUser2, are exaggerations 
 
 187.  Ying Lin, 10 Twitter Statistics Every Marketer Should Know in 2020 [Infographic], 
OBERLO (May 30, 2020), https://www.oberlo.com/blog/twitter-statistics. 
 188.  Katie Sehl, 27 Top Facebook Demographics that Matter to Social Media Marketers, 
HOOTSUITE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://blog.hootsuite.com/facebook-demographics/. 
 189.  Maryam Mohsin, 10 Instagram Stats Every Marketer Should Know in 2020 [Infographic], 
OBERLO (Jul. 6, 2020), https://www.oberlo.com/blog/instagram-stats-every-marketer-should-
know. 
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of the user’s political beliefs and are made within the context of an 
argument. Courts should view this statement as nonactionable 
hyperbole. On the other hand, the statement, “@TwitterUser2 is a far-
right extremist who participated in the U.S. Capitol insurrection” is a 
more serious accusation. This statement could cause @TwitterUser2 to 
lose his job, face social ostracization, and even be investigated by the 
government if it believes this statement may be true.190 Allegations of 
either a person’s membership in an extremist group, or their 
participation in an attempted coup, would both be specific enough to 
be proven either true or false; therefore, a court should look at this 
statement as potentially actionable defamation. 
Parsing the line between fact and opinion, particularly within the 
social media context, can be difficult given the conversational nature of 
these platforms. Although the aforementioned analysis may increase 
the liability social media users face when publishing content, it will 
provide an effective remedy to individuals harmed by false and 
damaging statements. Furthermore, other defenses like truthfulness 
can serve as backstops against this increased defamation liability. This 
analysis will ensure users are able to freely exercise their First 
Amendment rights on the Internet without impermissibly chilling their 
speech. 
B.  Influencers: The New Limited-Purpose Public Figures 
One way that courts may be able to counterbalance the heightened 
liability placed on social media users for damaging, false statements is 
to increase the requisite level of intent for this defamation. Increasingly, 
established consumer brands and companies turn to social media 
influencers and viral content publishers, rather than to celebrities, to 
create sponsorships and build content partnerships. These influencers 
publish a wide range of content, including clothing reviews, lifestyle 
marketing, travel blogs, and even “day in the life” relatable posts. In 
turn, other social media users follow, subscribe, and repost this content, 
expanding its reach and influence. These influencers’ voluntary 
involvement in public life, and their engagement in a “pattern of 
activity destined to invite attention and comment,” make them more 
like limited-purpose or even general-purpose public figures than 
 
 190.  See AJ Willingham and Carma Hassan, People at the U.S. Capitol Riot Are Being 
Identified and Losing Their Jobs, CNN (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/07/us/capitol-
riots-people-fired-jobs-trnd/index.html. 
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private individuals.191 Consequently, statements made about this 
emerging group of public figures would be held to the more stringent 
actual malice liability standard. 
Whether users are public or private individuals for liability 
purposes should not necessarily be determined by only looking at their 
social media profiles’ follower, like, or subscriber totals.192 Directing 
courts to look at numbers alone is not helpful: for instance, users with 
relatively fewer profile followers may still be considered influential in 
their respective fields (such as within the LGBTQ+ community or 
specific political circles). Although Twitter’s authentication of an 
account of public interest through blue check verification may be 
helpful in separating “online trolls” from legitimate accounts, it is not 
determinative of social status or notoriety.193 Courts should instead 
look to the “three R’s” used to measure impact in the marketing 
industry: reach, resonance, and reaction.194 Reach is defined as the 
number of people who have seen the content or profile. Resonance is 
the ability for the individual to influence consumption or other habits. 
Finally, reaction is the return on investment for the individual, 
measured by changes to follower or subscriber count, product sales, or 
even endorsement requests. 
Once social media influencers and viral stars are considered 
limited-purpose public figures using the “three R’s,” any allegedly 
defamatory statements published about them that relate to an “issue of 
public concern” should be assessed under the actual malice standard. 
This means that users would only be liable for statements made with 
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Thus, 
the standard would protect expressions of free speech and allow the 
“breathing space” necessary for open and robust public dialogue.195 
Nonetheless, the actual malice standard would not apply to those 
involuntarily thrust into the spotlight, such as social media users who 
are attacked by “online mobs” for their opinions and who otherwise do 
not seek public attention. As the Court has recognized, “instances of 
 
 191.  Batza, supra note 130, at 451–52. 
 192.  But see id. at 465 (arguing that Twitter users “do not have equal voices,” so courts should 
look to follower count to determine the “command of the channel that the plaintiff has”). 
 193.  About Verified Accounts, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-
account/about-twitter-verified-accounts (last accessed Mar. 2, 2021). 
 194.  Our Recipe for Successful Marketing and Media Strategies, NIELSEN, 
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/solutions/reach-resonance-reaction/ (last accessed Mar. 2, 2021). 
 195.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964). 
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truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.”196 Social 
media, however, is an environment that supports not only publishing 
on matters of public concern, but also treating the platform like a diary 
for personal anecdotes intended for a smaller social circle’s view. If one 
of these posts is incidentally shared widely or temporarily featured in 
“Twitter Top Trends,” it should not automatically mean that the user is 
no longer considered a private individual for purposes of defamation 
analysis. Consequently, social media users who take the opportunity to 
defame, dox, or otherwise harm these users could still be held liable 
under a negligence standard for posting false statements of fact. Only 
when a user voluntarily enters into the spotlight—such as by penning 
an op-ed, accepting brand sponsorships to raise profile visibility, or by 
speaking to the media on unrelated topics—should she be considered 
a limited-purpose public figure. 
C.  Equalized Treatment of Individual Platforms 
Courts have often treated the tone of social media statements 
differently, depending on the platform on which the statements were 
published. For example, bulletin boards and chat rooms are treated as 
a source of “casual, emotive, and imprecise speech.”197 In John Doe No. 
1 v. Cahill, the court alluded to this differential treatment of sources: 
Ranked in terms of reliability, there is a spectrum of sources on the 
[I]nternet. For example, chat rooms and blogs are generally not as 
reliable as the Wall Street Journal Online. Blogs and chat rooms tend 
to be vehicles for the expression of opinions; by their very nature, 
they are not a source of facts or data upon which a reasonable 
person would rely.198 
In contrast to their treatments of chat rooms, online bulletin boards, 
and blogs, courts are much more willing to treat online review sites like 
Yelp as serious sources of factual information. This is likely due to the 
way these platforms are used by consumers to evaluate products and 
businesses in order to make purchasing decisions. Because users treat 
these platforms as more reliable, courts are less forgiving of false 
statements that have the risk of incurring real harm on companies. 
Courts are less consistent, however, when it comes to the treatment 
of statements made on Twitter. For instance, the Jacobus court 
 
 196.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
 197.  Sandals Resorts Int’l Ltd. v. Google, 925 N.Y.S.2d 407, 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (citing 
O’Brien, supra note 101, at 2774–75). 
 198.  John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 465 (Del. 2005). 
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considered tweets to be “per se hyperbole,”199 while the Unsworth court 
determined tweets can still contain actionable facts.200 Although both 
tweets were published over the course of very public arguments and 
contained casual, emotive language, they were treated differently, but 
they should not have been. Within the context of Twitter, courts should 
be careful not to dismiss tweets as merely exaggerated expressions or 
opinions. Now that Twitter has become a global source of breaking 
news,201 and a majority of Americans rely on it as their primary news 
source,202 tweets are being taken seriously. False Twitter statements 
could therefore have serious ramifications for individuals’ reputations, 
employment opportunities, and finances. Social media posts are easily 
accessible through search engine results, which create a permanent 
online catalog of an individual’s persona. Courts should focus on the 
language contained within a social media post, regardless of its 
platform, to determine whether a statement at issue is actionable. 
D.  Reevaluating Jacobus v. Trump 
If the Jacobus v. Trump court conducted its defamation analysis 
using the approach recommended here, it might have found an 
actionable false statement of fact, rather than incorrectly dismissing all 
social media speech as nonactionable hyperbole. The statements made 
on Twitter accused Jacobus of having “begged us for a job,” and 
claimed that the Trump campaign “[t]urned her down twice and she 
went hostile.”203 In truth, Jacobus met with campaign officials twice 
before letting them know that she would not be interested in working 
with the campaign. The tweets also claimed that Jacobus was a “real 
dummy,” “really dumb,” and a “[m]ajor loser, zero credibility.”204 
The court dismissed these statements as part of a “petty quarrel,” 
the “familiar back-and-forth between a political commentator and the 
 
 199.  Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 200.  Unsworth v. Musk, No. 2:18-cv-08048-SVW-JC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167626 at *1 
(C.D. Cal. 2019). 
 201.  See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2018, 8:44 AM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20210104030911/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/973540
316656623616; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jul. 26, 2017, 9:04 AM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20210108045647/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890196
164313833472; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jun. 7, 2017, 7:44 AM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20210107000216/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/872419
018799550464. 
 202.  Grieco & Shearer, supra note 1. 
 203.  Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017). 
 204.  Id. 
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subject of her criticism.”205 This dismissal was premature, because in 
fact these statements were not common rebuttals of critical political 
commentary. Instead, they were spiteful responses meant to undermine 
Jacobus’s credibility. The court also excused the statements as part of 
Trump’s regular skewering of his opponents and critics. Under the 
analysis set forth in this Note, the statements could instead be viewed 
as actionable false statements of fact. The statement “begged us for a 
job” posits that Jacobus aggressively approached the campaign for a 
position. Additionally, the statement that the campaign “[t]urned her 
down twice” could be demonstrably false, proven through e-mail and 
text communications documenting Jacobus’s rejection of the position. 
Although the court viewed these statements as boisterous 
exaggerations, they portrayed Jacobus as someone desperate to work 
for the Trump campaign. This portrayal undermined her credibility as a 
political commentator and critic of Trump, and it cost her future job 
opportunities. 
Next, the court should have determined whether Jacobus was a 
public or private figure. This would have been a relatively easy analysis: 
Jacobus was a political commentator on television news channels and 
other media outlets, including CNN.206 She inserted herself into the 
Trump campaign coverage and was at least a limited-purpose public 
figure for the purposes of this controversy. Consequently, Jacobus 
would have had to prove that Trump made these statements with 
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth. 
Because Jacobus exchanged texts with campaign officials when she 
turned down the position, it may have been possible to prove Trump’s 
knowledge of the situation. This would have been a matter of 
examining the evidence, which the court did not adequately do. 
Finally, the court erred when it focused on the platform’s nature in 
its analysis of the statement’s context. The court placed too much 
weight in its view that social media was a less credible source of 
information.207 Twitter may be a platform for casual communications, 
but it is just as equally a platform for breaking news and serious 
information. The court should have evaluated these statements just as 
carefully as if they were made in a New York Times op-ed. 
 
 205.  Id. at 342. 
 206.  Id. at 334. 
 207.  Id. at 339. 
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E.  Response to Anticipated Critiques 
This approach raises several valid concerns. First, critics may 
contend that due to the democratized access to social media platforms, 
users unfamiliar with the risks of publishing false statements may find 
themselves facing litigation over tweets and posts they assumed were 
harmless missives. Although it is true that many social media users may 
not fully understand the power of their words broadcast across the 
Internet, they certainly would recognize the risk of publishing the same 
content on more traditional platforms like newspapers. Social media 
statements have just the same power to damage a person’s reputation 
and cause economic losses; consequently, they should be treated as 
seriously as traditionally-published statements under defamation 
analysis. Second, critics might point to the opening of floodgates of 
litigation if individuals sued social media users for every careless 
statement posted. True, individuals may be emboldened to bring claims 
against social media users who have posted false statements of fact if 
more courts award damages for social media defamation. However, 
these claims will still have to survive the pleading and motion to dismiss 
stages, so frivolous defamation litigation will not withstand scrutiny. 
Courts will also look to the context of statements made when assessing 
these social media defamation claims, distinguishing between serious, 
provable statements and more casual, exaggerated speech that falls 
under protected opinion. Finally, while this framework may be 
criticized as an imprecise balancing test, such is the nature of 
defamation litigation generally. One must determine from the unique 
facts of each case whether the speech rises to the level of a false 
statement of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Defamation cases involving social media speech present more gray 
areas than cases involving traditional media outlets. Users are more 
likely to remain anonymous; casual and imprecise speech may be 
presented as opinion rather than fact; the fast-paced nature of online 
speech often means statements are posted without much second 
thought. But because the Internet is a global communications platform 
with a permanent memory, this speech may be just as damaging, if not 
more so, as a news article or broadcast to a person’s reputation. Courts 
must weigh the benefits of an expansive marketplace of ideas on the 
Internet with the consequences of widespread false and defamatory 
speech. Furthermore, they must reckon with the development of the 
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social media influencer and the elevation of once-private individuals to 
a status more like limited-purpose public figures. They should do so by 
increasing the level of intent required to hold a publisher accountable 
for its false assertions of fact to an actual malice standard. As people 
increasingly view social media platforms as reliable news sources, so 
too must they face responsibility for the content they publish on these 
platforms. If courts treat all social media speech as opinion, shielded 
from liability, disinformation and baseless personal smears will 
continue to run rampant on the Internet without any effective 
guardrails. 
 
